The Roots of Strategic Maritime Policy and International Maritime Law in Elizabethan England

Authored by Daniel T. Murphy

ABSTRACT

Before the Elizabethan age, European states used their navies as close-in forward bastions and as extensions of the land forces and the fields of battle out to sea.  Under the Elizabethans, the privateers were the first to go to sea with the specific intent to gain sea control in the far cor­ners of the world, outside the traditional close-in forward bastion.  The crown developed a willingness to use mid­dle options in international relations (harassment, covert actions, theft, and privateering itself were all middle op­tions), vice the traditional options of diplomacy and war.  Together, the privateers and the crown redefined of the “laws” or norms of naval warfare.  Most important, the pri­vateers actually began to facilitate the development of the corpus of international law and the laws of naval warfare by taking their cases to court.

INTRODUCTION

According to historian J. Seeley, “It was in the Elizabethan age that England first assumed its modern character, and this means that then first it began to direct its energies to the sea and to the New World.  At this point then we mark the beginnings of the expansion, the first symptom of the rise of Great Britain.”1

Other historians say the Elizabethan Age was a time of “more loss than profit, of more misery than glory.”2  The reality is that the Elizabethan age was one of the most pro­found and measurable pe­riods in Western European maritime development, especially in the area of maritime-based international relations.

Before the Elizabethan age, European states used their navies as close-in forward bastions and as extensions of the land forces and the fields of battle out to sea.  Under the Elizabethans, the privateers were the first to go to sea with the specific intent to gain sea control in the far cor­ners of the world, outside the traditional close-in forward bastion.  The crown developed a willingness to use  Unit mid­dle options in international relations (harassment, covert actions, theft, and privateering itself were all middle op­tions), vice the traditional options of diplomacy and war.  Together, the privateers and the crown redefined of the “laws” or norms of naval warfare.  Most important, the pri­vateers actually began to facilitate the development of the corpus of international law and the laws of naval warfare by taking their cases to court.

The first part of this paper details the pre-Elizabethan prac­tice of using navies as close-in forward bastions.  The second part of the paper describes the move towards a strategic offense.  Part three discusses the redefinition of the laws of naval warfare.  Part four shows how the actions of the privateers actually facilitated the development of the corpus of modern maritime and naval law.  Finally, I will show that the evolution of the laws of naval warfare resulted in the increased profes­sionalization, organization, and specialization of European sea power.

THE CLOSE-IN FOWARD BASTION

“Whether to win from Spaine that was not Spaines,
Or to acquite us of sustained wronge,
Or intercept their Indian hoped gaines,
Thereby to weaken them, and make us stronge,
Heere to discuss, to me doth not belong.”3

While England was at war with France and was experiencing disunity at home, a writer thought to be Adam Moleyns, wrote a poem called The Libell of Englische Policye.  He said “Cherish marchaundyes, keep th’amiraltee, That we be maysteres of the narrow see.”4  The narrow sea was the En­glish Channel, and it was England’s first and most important line of defense against the continent.

Moleyns’ statement was representative of the way Western Eu­ropeans viewed maritime strategy.  They used their navies as a close-in forward bastion and an extension of their land forces and the field of battle out to sea.  Although Spain and Portugal saw themselves as missionaries and colonists, their primary design was the consolidation and protection of the Iberian Peninsula – Not sea control in the far corners of the world.  According to Mahan, the French, with rare excep­tions, subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations, grudged the money spent upon it, and there­fore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a defensive position and limiting its efforts to the repelling of as­saults.5

At first, the early Tudor Navy, under Henry VII was among the best examples of the close-in forward bastion.6  The En­glish Navy was said to have dated from the time of Alfred.  Richard III’s navy consisted of seven ships.  The Tudors were the first in Europe to build ships and shore installa­tions and train personnel on a large scale.  Henry built a navyCoast Guard , which could hold the Chan­nel and blockade the enemy while he invaded France.  Royal dockyards were built at Portsmouth, Woolwich, Deptford, and Erith.

At Henry’s death there were fifty-three ships called car­racks.  They were built high, wide, and top heavy, with large forecastles and poops to accommodate soldiers for laying-to and boarding.  They had high towers for archers and handguns, and 200-300 small caliber guns, which fired chain and canister shot to sweep the opposing vessel’s decks.  They were not supposed to sink the enemy.  The design of the car­rack, and the large crew complement worked well in home wa­ters, when close to ports and supplies.  Their purpose was to extend the field of battle out onto the sea.  Henry began the transition to more seaworthy platforms, and the use of the heavy-caliber broadside.

Henry VIII continued his father’s program by adding twenty-four ships to the fleet during the first five years of his reign, by both building new vessels and purchasing others from the Italians and Hanseatics.  He followed the Italian innovation of placing heavy guns low in the vessel.  Guns began to be specially designed and mounted for shipboard use.  New ships were designed with increased beam and draft, square sterns, gun-ports, and both upper and lower tiers of guns.  The transition to heavy caliber guns and vessels with more seamen and fewer soldiers continued but was not fully real­ized until John Hawkins revitalized the fleet beginning in the 1570’s under Elizabeth.7  The later Elizabethan ves­sels were galleon built, with three or four masts.  The pri­vate war­ships sailed by the privateers were equal in strength to the royal ships of the same tonnage.

It was a time of intensive technological development in ship­building.  Equally important were technological break­throughs in nav­igation.  Martin Cortes’ Breve compendio de la shera y de la arte de Nevegar, was published in Seville in 1551 and 1556 and translated into English in 1561 as The Arte of Navigation, William Bourne’s A Regiment for the Sea was published in 1574.  In 1595 John Frampton translated Pe­dro de Medina’s Arte de Navegar of 1545.

The stage was set for significant changes in naval warfare and maritime policy.  According to Marcus, the duel between Regent and Cordelie in 1512 during the First French War was the last of the me­dieval style sea-fights in English his­tory.8

THE ROOTS OF STRATEGIC MARITIME POLICY

“English commercial policy carried that tinge of bellicosity which was to characterize it for cen­turies until the sweet reasonableness of free trade doctrines came to pervade it in the nine­teenth century.  International commerce was con­ceived of as a kind of battleground on which na­tions contended with one another for possession of the precious metals and for profitable employment for their merchants.”9

Hawkins and his contemporaries were the first to go to sea with the specific intent to gain sea control by winning naval engagements in the far corners of the world, outside the traditional close-in forward bastion.  They sparked a new way of thinking which was the driving force behind the English desire to colonize.  Richard Hak­luyt devoted several sections of his Discourse on Western Planting to the idea of the colony as a naval outpost and its value in striking at “root of Spanish power, which lay overseas.”10  A similar plan was proposed by Sir Humphrey Gilbert in a memoranda en­titled How Her Majesty may annoy the King of Spain.11

Eliza­beth’s court became more focused on striking hard, and striking home by controlling what we now call the sea lanes of communication and trade, and attacking the enemy’s sources of wealth and raw materials.  Captain Nicholas Down­ton attacked the sea lanes of communication and trade and had “happie successe against the Vice-Roy and all the Indian sea forces of the Portugalls, by force and cunning attempt­ing their destruction.”12  The privateers fleshed out the continuum of force which was an important ingredient for Elizabeth’s judicious blending of both sea power and land power.

A key element in being able to conduct naval operations in the far corners of the world was to have an in-depth knowl­edge of those areas.  Hawkins’ purpose went, Lulu Press,hen he sailed to Japan, the Philippines, China, and the East Indies was to record longitude and latitudes, coastlines, ports, bays, cities, towns, peoples, manners of government, commodities which they needed, and commodities they could provide.  His purpose was to collect intelligence.13

Hawkins’ did not base his strategy on the defense of the Channel.  His strategy was to strike at the roots of the en­emy’s resources.  He wanted to cut off Spain’s treasure routes with a new fleet of fast, maneu­verable, blue water ships.  He was also determined to strike hard.  The new ships were designed to sink the enemy with the heavy caliber broadside.  The concept was new, and was met with a great deal of opposition.  Kennedy said “To Sir Francis Drake (and Hawkins) the warship was a mobile battery; to the Duke of Medina Sidonia it was a platform to carry the swordsmen and musketeers into action.”14  But Hawkins had Burghley’s con­fidence, was appointed Treasurer of the Navy in 1578, and retired nine years later after building a formidable and seaworthy navy.15

The concept is significant today in comparing and contrast­ing the U.S. and Soviet fleets.  The force structure of our Navy is driven by a strategic maritime policy, which owes its legacy to the Elizabethans.  The United States must be able to strike anywhere in the world.  Our na­tional defense pol­icy is based on a good offense.  It is best summed up in the motto of one U.S. Navy ship; “strike hard, strike home.”  The Soviet strategy was the pre-Eliza­bethan one.  It was an extension of the land forces, and the forward bastion of the motherland.

Mahan said the sea is “a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose cer­tain lines of travel rather than others.”16  The privateers were responsible in part, for the move away from naval war­fare as the traditional close-in forward bastion, when they exposed the vulnerability of the Spanish possessions and their well-worn paths of commerce in the Americas.  As West­ern European powers began to move away from the concept of the traditional close-in forward bastion, they began to place greater emphasis on controlling the frontiers and the sea-lanes of communication and trade.

Western Europe had a new frontier in the Americas, far away from the eyes of kings, councils, church, and people.  There was an increased opportunity for nations to use middle op­tions in international relations out on the frontiers.  As long as her captains stayed in the far corners of the world when they broke the laws of nations and naval warfare, the Elizabethan court was less accountable.  Rather than depend­ing on the two traditional options of diplomacy and war, Elizabeth was able to use a continuum of force, including privateering, harassment, covert actions, theft, and de­grees of sea control.  According to Spears, to save the un­bearable expense of supporting a Navy, she used the priva­teers to make limited war on the enemy.  He said their work though, was characterized by no milder term than that of “semi-buccaneering.”17

The unique nature of these conflicts (they were short, vio­lent, and often unresolved engagements) out on the frontier caused accusations of moral and legal infractions by both the English and the Spanish.  On the surface, the laws of nations on the sea seemed to take a turn for the less struc­tured, the less civil, and the more insidious.

MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES

“That by the lawe of Nations, traffique is free to all.”18

Spears said the profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long be­fore the true principles which governed its growth and pros­perity were detected.  To secure one’s own people a dispro­portionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.19  Spears meant that interna­tional law was still in the development phase, that it was being developed mostly through the interaction on the seas of the Western European powers, and that international af­fairs normally took the form of the two extremes of diplo­macy or war, with little else in between.

The ancient Roman Navy redefined the naval rules of engage­ment by laying-to and boarding their adversaries, instead of using ram tactics.  The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw re­definitions in the naval rules of engagement, which re­sulted from the invention of steam, tactical air warfare, submarine warfare, and nuclear weapons.

The Elizabethans had their own redefinition of the laws of naval warfare when they adopted extensive, state-sponsored piracy or privateering.  The English privateering ventures may have begun as early as the 1560’s.  The apex was Drake’s voyage of 1577-80.  When their losses began to add up, the Spanish used convoys for protection during the Atlantic crossings.  Their settlements and shipping in the Caribbean and on the Spanish Main re­mained vulnerable.  English priva­teering ventures concen­trated on those weak links.  They used both large vessels and small pinnaces equipped with oars and sails.  The tac­tics were speed, surprise, and the unpredictable.  Spain said Drake and his contemporaries were pirates.  But the priva­teers fought their war with Spain, for what they thought were good reasons.

Hawkins and his contemporaries were successful partly be­cause they did not play by the rules.  Their way of fighting was brisk, less systematic, and most importantly, less pre­dictable than their adversaries.20  Spanish governors com­plained that the English were “more dull and senseless than animals”21 and were shameless in the way they destroyed sa­cred images and crucifixes.22  Drake and his crewmembers al­legedly committed robberies and as­saults when they were in port,23 ate meat during Lent and on Friday, did not keep the commandments, and were against the Pope.24

The helpless tone of the Spanish correspondences confirm that they were not equipped to deal with adversaries like Drake and his contemporaries who did not play by the rules, as roughly defined as the rules were.25  The governor of Florida wrote to Spain saying he did not know where to begin to relate the hardship and misery which he went through when Drake arrived at Saint Augustine with 23 large vessels, 19 pinnaces, frigates, and shallops, and a landing party of over 2000.  Drake occupied the fort, sacked the town, burned the church, cut down the fruit trees, and carried off their ar­tillery and supplies.26  In Santo Domingo, Drake’s troops sacked the city, burned the Franciscan monastery, two nun­neries, and almost half the city.27  Another Spanish offi­cial said Drake was “so expert and astute a corsair,”28 and that “the inhabitants could not be prepared against anything so unseen, unheard and unthought of.”29 When the Earl of Cumberland plundered the coasts of Hispaniola in 1593-4, the Spanish admitted that he kept Santo Domingo beleaguered for two months and plundered with impunity.30

The scope of the privateering operations, and the lists of commodities which the English took from Spanish ships and settlements is ex­tensive and well documented in Spanish cor­respondence, docu­ments from the English High Court of Admi­ralty, and the nar­ratives of Hakluyt and Purchas.

According to Andrews, offi­cial reports, investigations and laconic accounts of English seamen give historians a measure of the psychological, eco­nomic, and naval impact of the En­glish voyages to the West.  The Spanish, although they tended to exaggerate the scale of the attacks and the enemy casualties, described the color and excitement of the bat­tles.31

The English explained their actions by blaming the Span­ish for not abiding by the “rule of the Lawe of Na­tions… that it is lawful for any Nation to go to any other, and to trade with it,” and “that Nature hath granted a pas­sage for all Nations unto all.”32  English privateering clearly began as a response to the perceived “insolent be­havior of the Spaniards, and the neglect of the Spanish gov­ernment to pun­ish effectively the misdeeds of its subjects and…the deci­sion of the Inquisition that all heretics whom it could reach were amenable to its laws, the frequent con­fiscation of English property, and the imprisonment and ill-usage of English subjects.”33  According to Kennedy, to seize a Span­ish treasure-ship was not only to become rich overnight, it was to strike a blow against what Raleigh termed the ambi­tious and bloody pretenses of Madrid, which sought to devour all nations and to subject them to the Catholic religion.34

Richard Hakluyt said the Spanish were more cruel than the Turks.  “So many and so monstrous have bene the Spanishe cruelties, suche straunge slaughters and mur­ders of those peaceable, lowly, milde, and gentle people to­gether with the spoiles of Townes, provinces, and kingdomes which have bene moste ungodly perpetrated in the west In­dies.”35  He said the Spanish “take away that most laudable society of mankind, they take away the mutuall occasions of doing good, and to conclude, vyolate Nature herself.”36  Even Francois I of France remarked “I should very much like to see the clause in Adam’s will that excludes me from a share in the world.”37

According to Spears, international law did not exist, “but there was, nevertheless, a sort of custom of dealing between nations which stood for what we call law.”38  The Dutch Ju­rist Hugo Grotius wrote in 1625 that humankind is ultimately one community, and that there is a natural law, above na­tions, based on right reason.  Brown explained that from the nature of man, right reason can deduce the laws that should govern the interaction of individuals in civil society, and similarly it can deduce from the nature of states the laws that should govern the interaction among states in interna­tional society.39  When Hawkins and Drake sailed to the West Coast of Africa in 1567, and then to South America where they traded slaves in Vera Cruz.  Twenty-four Spanish ships opened fire on them in violation of a written agreement with the Captain of the Port.  When they applied to King Philip for redress, they were refused.  Drake applied to Elizabeth for a letter of marque, and was permitted to fit out his own expedition to capture enough goods from the enemy to recoup all his losses and expenses with interest.

Because the complaints both by and against the privateers were heard in courts of law, the common set of Western Euro­pean values in regards to what was jus in bello began to move from an informal maritime code of honor rested in me­dieval chivalry to a better definition of the laws of naval warfare and rules of engagement, and the laws of nations in general.

Although on the surface, the laws of nations on the sea dur­ing the Elizabethan era seemed to become less structured, the actions of the privateers, and more specifically the complaints by the English and Spanish merchants and seamen in the courts, facilitated the development of the corpus of modern maritime and naval law.  The English complained mainly that the Spanish monopoly of the Americas, and their non-tolerance of commercial or colonial competition consti­tuted a jus ad bellum, or right to self-defense.  The Span­ish claimed mainly that the English means of waging the war violated what was jus in bello (just war).

THE EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH SEA POWER

The evolving laws of naval warfare and the new rules of en­gagement resulted in the increased professionalization and specialization of the English seamen.  Western Europe turned permanently towards standing navies and ships designed specifically for war.

“In this most famous and peerlesse gouernment of her most excellent Maiesty, her subjects through the speciall assistance, and blessing of God, in searching the most opposite corners and quarters of the world, and… in compassing the vaste globe of the earth more then once, haue excelled all the nations and people of the earth.”40

Power went to whoever could guide the development of values issues in foreign affairs, including the laws of nations, the laws of naval warfare, and the rules of engagement.  Al­though there were a number of effective transactional na­tions in Europe, especially the Dutch, England became the transformational leader.

Henry VIII set up the organization which became the Navy Board.  According to Marcus, no other European state pos­sessed such a simple, efficient, and unified system of naval administration.40  Drake insisted that fighting ships be manned by professional fighting seamen, not by gentlemen in search of glory and adventure.  According to Thrower, this was a new innovation in Western European seafaring.  The En­glish and Dutch were the first to adopt the new policy which was a key to their success over the next three centuries.42  Robert Dudley’s L’Arcano del Mare (Secret of the Sea) which was written in Italian, with its books on maritime and mili­tary discipline and naval architecture of vessels of war, is testimony to the professionalization of the English Navy.43  According to Marcus, the Spanish maritime view emphasized strict government control, careful regimentation, and formal instruction at official schools of navigation.  The English approach to seafaring was more flexible, individualistic, and well suited to the English seamen.44  According to Parks, Portugal and Spain “had been first in the field but had allowed their methods to become stereotyped and life­less.”45  According to Wernham, the greater part of the Queen’s navy was transformed from a short-range, coastal de­fense force into a high-seas fleet capable of operating at long range as an ocean going force.46

CONCLUSION

“What we do perceive happening under the Tudors is the unfolding of England’s potential to become a great maritime power.  The central axioms of the doctrine of sea power- in particular, the need to secure command of the maritime trade routes through the superior battle fleet- were being slowly worked out and understood.”47

The Elizabethan Age was not a time of “more loss than profit, of more misery than glory.”  It was the most impor­tant period in the development of modern sea power.  For England, it was a period of profound growth.  The profits from privateering came to 10-15 percent of the country’s im­ports, led to a large increase in shipping, and contributed largely to the decline of the Portuguese and Spanish mer­chant marines, to the benefit of the English.48

Before the Elizabethan age, European states used their navies as close-in forward bastions and an extension of the land forces and the fields of battle out to sea.  Technolog­ical advances in shipbuilding, geography, and navigation caused changes first in naval tactics, and then in the laws or norms of naval warfare and rules of engagement.  Hawkins and his peers were the first to go to sea with the specific intent to gain sea control in the far corners of the world, outside the traditional close-in forward bastion.  The Eliz­abethans broke the existing norms, when the state sometimes sponsored, sometimes rewarded, and often didn’t punish indi­viduals engaged in privateering.  The privateers actually began to facilitate the development of the corpus of inter­national law and the laws of naval warfare and rules of en­gagement by taking their cases to court.  When Europeans changed their views on what was jus in bello, naval warfare became more structured, more destructive, and more profes­sionalized.

In the end, the value added by the Elizabethan mariners can be measured in terms of cultural dynamics, the tendency to­ward transformational change, and the ability to guide the evolution of international law and moral issues in world af­fairs.

FOOTNOTES

1 J. Seeley, The Expansion of England, London, 1884, page 107-108.

2 G. Parks, Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages, Frederick Ungar, New York, 1961, page xiii.

3 A. Grosart, The Poems of the Rev. Charles Fitzgeoffrey, 1593-1636, Manchester, 1881, page G1r.1.

4 O. Warner, English Maritime Writing: Hakluyt to Cook, Published for The British Council and The Na­tional Book League by Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1958, page 7.

5 A. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, Little Brown, 1943, page 6.

6 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Scribner’s, New York, 1976, page 15-16.

7 G. Elton, England Under the Tudors, Methuen and Co., 1974, page 353-355.

8 G. Marcus, A Naval History of England, Longmans, London, 1961, page 35.

9 B. Murphy, A History of the British Economy 1086-1970, London, page 89.

10 G. Parks, 1961, page 88.

11 G. Parks, 1961, page 89; “Discourse on Western Planting by Richard Hakluyt, 1584,” The Original Writings and Correspondences of the Two Richard Hakluyts, Cambridge University Press, London, 1935, page 211-326.

12 “The Journal of Captain Nicholas Downton,” The Voyage of Nichaolas Downton to the East Indies 1614-15 As recorded in Contemporary Narratives and Letters, Hakluyt Society, London, 1939, page 1.

13 The Observations of Sir Richard Hawkins, Knight, in his Voyage into the South Sea in the year 1593, Hakluyt Society, London, 1847, page 7.

14 G. Trevelyan, History of England, Pelican, NY, 1942, page 248.

15 G. Elton, 1974, page 356.

16 A. Mahan, 1943, page 25.

17 J. Spears, Master Mariners, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1912, page 118-119.  Kennedy said “she re­mained deeply conscious of how vulnerable England was to invasion whenever the Royal Navy was cruising in distant waters.”  P. Kennedy, 1976, page 28.

18 “Extract from Richard Hakluyt’s Translation of Grotius’ Mare Liberum, 1609,” The Original Writings and Correspondences of the Two Richard Hakluyts, Cambridge University Press, London, 1935, page 497.

19 A. Spears, 1941, page 1.

20 State Papers Relating to The Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Navy Records Society, 1981, page xi.

21 “Letter from the Viceroy of New Spain, Martin Enriquez, to King Philip II,” New Light on Drake, Cam­bridge University Press, London, 1914, page 216.

22 “Letter from Gaspar de Vargas, Alcalde Mayor or Chief Alcalde of Guatulco, to the Viceroy of New Spain in which he gives an account of the entrance of an English corsair into the port,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914, page 214.

23 “Letter from the Audiencia of Mexico to His Majesty informing him of the entrance of Drake’s armada into guatulco and of the dispositions ordered by the Viceroy,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge Univer­sity Press, London, 1914, page 224.

24 “Deposition of Domingo de Lizarza, Clerk of the Ship of San Juan de Anton, taken prisoner on March 1, 1579,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914, page 179.

25 “Letter from Doctor Fernando Robles, Judge of the Court of Mexico, to King Philip II, New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914, page 227.

26 “Don Francisco de Varte to the Crown, San Lucar, June 25, 1586,” Further English Voyages to Spanish America, 1583-1594, University Press, London, 1951, page 163.

27 “Rodrigo Fernandez de Ribera to the Crown, Santo Domingo, June 30, 1586,” Further English Voyages to Spanish America, 1583-1594, University Press, London, 1951, page 179.

28 “Letter from Don Luis de Velasco to his majesty concerning the entrance of the corsair into the south sea and of the robberies and iniquities he committed,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914, page 230.

29 “Letter from Viceroy Martin Enriquez to the Viceroy of Peru,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge Univer­sity Press, London, 1914, page 242.

30 “Trujillo report of Langton’s raid on Puerto de Caballos,” English Privateering Voyages to the West Indies, 1588-95, Cambridge, 1959, page 281-283.

31 K. Andrews, English Privateering Voyages to the West Indies 1588-1595, Cambridge, 1959, page 2.

32 “Extract from Richard Hakluyt’s Translation of Grotius’ Mare Liberum, 1609,” 1935, page 498.

33 W. Vaux in The World Encompassed by Sir Francis Drake, Hakluyt Society, London, 1854, page vii.

34 J. Rose, A. Newton, and E. Benians (ed), The Cambridge History of the British Empire, i, Cambridge, 1929, page 111, and P. Kennedy, 1976, page 23.

35 “Discourse on Western Planting by Richard Hakluyt, 1584,” 1935, page 211.

36 “Extract from Richard Hakluyt’s Translation of Grotius’ Mare Liberum, 1609,” 1935, page 498.

37 O. Warner, 1958, page 8.

38 J. Spears, 1912, page 122.

39 S. Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War, St. Martin’s Press, NY, 1987, page 142.

40 R. Hakluyt, “Epistle Dedicatorie,” The Principall navigations, voiages and discoveries of the En­glish nation, Cambridge Hakluyt Society and the Peabody Museum of Salem, 1965, page 2v.

41 G. Marcus, 1961, page 44.

42 J. Parry, “Drake and the World Encompassed,” in Sir Francis Drake and the Famous Voyage, 1577-1580, Essays Commemorating the quadricentennial of Drake’s circumnavigation of the Earth, ed. N. Thrower, University of California, London, 1984, page 10.

43 G. Warner in The Voyage of Robert Dudley to the West Indes, 1594-1595, Bedford Press, London, 1899, page 1xiii.

44 G. Marcus, 1961, page 67.

45 G. Parks, 1961, page xiv.

46 R. Wernham, Before the Armada.  The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1558, Cambridge, 1964, page 343.

47 P. Kennedy, 1976, page 34-35.

48 K. Andrews, Drakes Voyages, London, 1970, page 128,226-231.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Deposition of Domingo de Lizarza, Clerk of the Ship of San Juan de Anton, taken prisoner on March 1, 1579,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914.

“Discourse on Western Planting by Richard Hakluyt, 1584,” The Original Writings and Correspondences of the Two Richard Hakluyts, Cambridge University Press, London, 1935.

“Don Francisco de Varte to the Crown, San Lucar, June 25, 1586,” Further English Voyages to Spanish America, 1583-1594, University Press, London, 1951.

“Extract from Richard Hakluyt’s Translation of Grotius’ Mare Liberum, 1609,” The Original Writings and Correspondences of the Two Richard Hakluyts, Cambridge University Press, Lon­don, 1935.

“Letter from Doctor Fernando Robles, Judge of the Court of Mexico, to King Philip II,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914.

“Letter from Don Luis de Velasco to his majesty concerning the entrance of the corsair into the south sea and of the robberies and iniquities he committed,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914.

“Letter from Gaspar de Vargas, Alcalde Mayor or Chief Al­calde of Guatulco, to the Viceroy of New Spain in which he gives an account of the entrance of an English corsair into the port,” New Light on Drake, Cambridge University Press, London, 1914.

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Copyright Daniel T. Murphy 2012.  All rights reserved.

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