Extending our Intelligence Enterprise Across Borders

Authored by:  Daniel T. Murphy

INTRODUCTION

While our intelligence community has certainly made improvements since 9-11, it remains a labyrinth of semi-connected agencies and infrastructures.  The community has tried hard for a decade to become more integrated, and has been only partially successful.  We remain in the infant stages of stitching the community into a coherent whole that can provide more meaningful strategic insight to the president and other policymakers.  Yet, despite the fact that we do not have our national house in order, policymakers and military leaders alike are stressing multi-national integration and interoperation like never before.  Are we ready to better integrate with our allies when we are not yet well-integrated ourselves?  If yes, with whom should we partner, and how should we partner.  Or, should we take the realist path and fix ourselves first?

This paper will first briefly discuss some of the national security challenges that endure within our own borders, how those challenges impact our intelligence community, and why our intelligence community is only partly hitting the mark.  Then, to better understand the challenges of integrating outside our borders, we will look briefly at a foreign intelligence community with whom we interoperate regularly, namely the United Kingdom.  The intention is not to exhaustively understand the UK intelligence community.  Rather, the intention is to better understand the idea of organizational synergies, and to begin to develop a mental model that will be helpful in answering the question – With whom should we partner, and how should we partner?

OUR LABYRINTH

Roger George and Harvey Rishikoff’s book, The National Security Enterprise describes a “labyrinth” of national security and intelligence organizations that “prefer to operate using their well-developed processes and traditional missions, rather than adapt to new conditions or surrender control to other agencies.”[1]

George and Rishikoff believe the most significant challenge in our national security enterprise is that there is no single entity capable of designing a grand strategy.  The effect on the intelligence community is that we do not have a proper single strategic customer to serve.  Similarly, Jon Rosenwasser and Michael Warner believe that, although our processes for making and executing foreign policy have grown more “centralized and rationalized, and more inclusive of multiple viewpoints” in recent years, things remain “remarkably dispersed and their coordination ad hoc” due to the constitutional fragmentation of power.[2]  George and Rishikoff see the National Security Council as part of the problem.  Because the NSC is not “operational”, and because it lacks sufficient and effective strategic planning resources, it can merely play the role of “traffic cop, scheduler of meetings, and mediator, rather than strategic planner.”  The result is that we are not able to clearly define our national interests, and we have no organization with the authority to implement a strategy to achieve those interests.[3]  The labyrinth of national security policy-making entities is itself supported by a labyrinth in the form of a bifurcated (military versus civilian) and fragmented (across many agencies) intelligence community.

Gary Shiffman and Jonathan Hoffman describe a second significant challenge in our national security enterprise that also extends to our intelligence community – Our tendency to make bad organizational design decisions.  We try to align missions, drive collaboration, and improve mission effectiveness by adding layers of bureaucracy.  And when things don’t get better, we scratch our heads and wonder why.  Shiffman and Hoffman point specifically to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where we placed twenty-two different agencies under a single secretary.  Rather than creating synergies and a common purpose, DHS has become a spaghetti mess of competing and overlapping missions, visions and cultures.  They point to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as a second example of organization design gone awry.  The creation of the DNI and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has not reduced the number of interagency disputes and turf wars in the intelligence community.  In fact, ODNI has made the landscape even more confusing and prone to dysfunction.  It has not resulted in a better integrated or more efficient intelligence community.  It hasn’t helped us become better collectors, analysts, or producers, and it hasn’t helped us achieve cost efficiencies.[4]

THE CHALLENGE FROM OUR POLICY MAKERS

Despite the fact that our house is in disorder, policy makers are setting the bar higher.  Our National Security Strategy is asking us to “be steadfast in strengthening those old alliances that have served us so well . . . modernize them to meet the challenges of a new century,” and build “new and deeper partnerships in every region.”  Collaboration is similarly emphasized in our National Defense Strategy, in our National Military Strategy, and in all strategy documents down to the combatant command level.  PACOM’s regional strategy says we will “strengthen and expand relationships with allies and partners.”[5]

The problem is that deepening global security cooperation requires also deepening intelligence cooperation.  Consider the president’s challenge in the National Security Strategy that we will “work with all the key players . . . nationally and internationally, to investigate cyber intrusion and to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents.”[6]  Our intelligence community labyrinth will make such coordination at the national level difficult enough.  Coordinating across borders will be an even greater challenge.

Even the DNI’s National Intelligence Strategy says that we will “strengthen existing and establish new partnerships with foreign and domestic, public and private entities to improve access to sources of information and intelligence, and ensure appropriate dissemination of Intelligence Community products and services.”[7]  The good news is that the DNI understands the trickiness of integrating outside our borders – “We will identify and prioritize which partnerships to form, when and under what conditions . . . and assess the effectiveness of partnerships individually and collectively and adjust them accordingly.”[8]

Our allies are saying similar things.  The British National Security Strategy states that the UK can best pursue its interests through a “commitment to collective security” and “key alliances, notably with the United States of America.”[9]  The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) states “Alliances and partnerships will remain a fundamental part of our approach to defence and security. Internationally, we rarely act alone. Maintaining and building constructive and reciprocal bilateral relationships across all aspects of national security can enhance capability and maximise efficiency.”[10]

In other words, policy makers are creating heaps of documents emphasizing partnerships, alliances, bilateral relationships and collective security.  But, what do these words mean for a very realist-minded US intelligence community?  Can we really take our international security relationships to a next level?  Can we pursue a more global national security approach without pursuing a more globalized intelligence community as well?  Will our realist heritage allow us to trust our allies and share our secrets?  Can we really begin to operate as a global intelligence community, when our national intelligence community remains a non-integrated hodge-podge of activities?

Answering such questions is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, we can take a quick survey of the landscape in order to begin to understand where cross-border synergies and non-synergies lay.  The remainder of this paper is a survey of the components of the foreign intelligence community with whom we work most often – The United Kingdom.  To frame the scope, the paper will concentrate primarily on Britain’s civilian intelligence agencies – The equivalent of the US National Intelligence Program (NIP).  To draw certain contrasts, we will also briefly discuss select components of the German and Italian intelligence communities.  The paper will look briefly across six dimensions: Intelligence Community Leadership; Domestic Intelligence; Foreign Intelligence; Signals Intelligence; Law Enforcement Intelligence; and Intelligence Oversight.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

The United Kingdom’s intelligence community, known as the “National Intelligence Machinery” is coordinated by the Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience.  Similar to our DNI, the Permanent Secretary advises the Prime Minister on agency coordination, defines national intelligence requirements, and assesses and manages performance across the agencies.  To accomplish this, the Permanent Secretary acts as Chairman of a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which includes the heads of the intelligence agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and senior representatives of the Foreign Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Home Office and the Treasury.  Unlike the US DNI, the Permanent Secretary is the Accounting Officer for the Single Intelligence Account.  The JIC is responsible for indications and warnings of worldwide threats that could affect British interests.  It draws on all source intelligence, and advises the Prime Minister and other policy makers.[11]  While the Permanent Secretary and JIC have some similarities with our DNI and ODNI, the Permanent Secretary’s accountability seems to be more explicitly recognized, with the intention of giving the Prime Minister a single “throat to choke.”

Similar to our ODNI and the UK’s JIC, Italy has the Dipartimento informazioni per la sicurezza (DIS) or Security Intelligence Department.  The DIS is kept informed of intelligence operations being conducted by Italy’s two civilian intelligence agencies, the AISE and AISI (described later in this paper).  DIS promotes cooperation between those two agencies, the military services and Italian law enforcement, and it facilitates the flow of intelligence to the President of the Council of Ministers and other policy makers.[12] Like the US and UK, Italy has a measure of accountability at the top echelon, and the buck stops at or near the top.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

Domestic intelligence is the domain where most countries differ in their organizational philosophies, missions and structures.  The UK’s Security Service, also known as MI5, is the one UK intelligence agency for which the US does not really have a comparable agency.  Domestic intelligence is something that is de-emphasized in the US, especially after domestic collection abuses were discovered by the Rockefeller Commission and congressional inquiries in the 1970s.  While the US quietly keeps domestic intelligence in a corner of an agency (FBI), the UK created the MI5 agency specifically for the purpose of domestic intelligence, and is emphatic in telling the public why domestic intelligence is necessary: “Although publicly available information can be helpful for background purposes, the best way to discover the intentions and actions of organisations and individuals posing a threat to national security is to obtain secret intelligence about their activities. Over time, we collate this information and seek to develop detailed knowledge of target organisations, their key personalities, infrastructure, intentions, plans, and capabilities.”[13]

MI5 is a secret service that has been in operation since 1905, and is tasked with counter-terrorism, counter-espionage, and providing advice to other agencies and organizations in the UK to help them reduce their vulnerability to threats.  The Security Service Act 1989 placed MI5 under the authority of the Home Secretary.  MI5 investigates suspect individuals and organizations that are deemed to be threats to the state.  They collect, analyze and produce intelligence on domestic targets, compile evidence to bring suspects to justice, and form partnerships with other UK and foreign security and intelligence organizations to detect, deter and defeat threats.

Italy’s model is similar to the British.  The Agenzia informazioni per la sicurezza interna (AISI) or Internal Intelligence and Security Agency is responsible for intelligence and counter-espionage activities carried out inside Italy.  The AISI is directly answerable to the President of the Council of Ministers.[14]

The reason why some countries differ in the way they approach domestic intelligence typically has to do with their organizational heritage.  The UK’s emphasis on domestic intelligence can be understood within the context of the First and Second World Wars, where German espionage was a significant concern.  For the US, our wariness of domestic intelligence can be traced to our revolutionary history, where we threw off the yoke of a European oppressor, and declared in our Constitution our citizens’ inalienable right to privacy.  In a very different example, the mission set of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, called the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, or Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), comes from a darker heritage. The BfV reports to the Ministry of the Interior, and emphasizes that they maintain only the minimal necessary amount of secrecy in their operations, and rely on mostly open source intelligence.  Germany’s experiences in the early twentieth century explain why the BfV’s focus has been on right-wing and left-wing extremist groups and other groups that could threaten the constitution and principles of freedom and democracy.  The BfV has more recently shifted emphasis toward Islamic extremist groups.[15]

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

The UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), known as MI6, has an historical lineage that stretches back to the Tudor-Stuart era under Henry VII, Thomas Cromwell and Elizabeth I.  The agency was formally established in 1909 to counter the threat of German military and naval expansion, and foreign espionage activity in the UK. MI6 has responsibility for foreign intelligence, and provides the government with a global covert capability to support UK national security interests.  MI6’s mission is described in the British National Security Strategy and in the Strategic Defence and Security (SDSR) document.  Similar to the US philosophy, the SDSR describes an increased emphasis on identifying threats and opportunities early, shaping developments and preventing threats from emerging.  The SDSR focuses MI6 on areas that are synergistic with our CIA: Early indication and warning of threats to the UK; responding to more developed threats, which includes supporting the NATO ISAF effort in Afghanistan; and developing bilateral intelligence relationships with the UK’s ‘Five Eyes’ partners (US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) and newer intelligence partners.[16] MI6 is specifically tasked to focus on four mission sets: Counter-terrorism; counter-proliferation; cyber security and instability and security overseas.

In the counter-terrorism domain, MI6’s role is to “detect and disrupt terrorist threats overseas to the UK and its interests,” and to “work closely with the Security Service in their efforts to disrupt threats in the UK, where the threat has an international angle.”  In the counter-proliferation domain, MI6 collects intelligence on adversaries’ acquisitions of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and when necessary, disrupts those efforts. In cyber security, MI6 collects intelligence on the intentions and plans of governments and non-State actors to conduct cyber operations against the UK.[17]  In the instability and security domain, MI6 collects intelligence and delivers interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states suffering from instability, weak government and poor security.

Comparable to the way US policy makers use our CIA, UK policy makers believe “early political interventions can reduce the likelihood of prolonged instability and suffering, and prevent the need for a more expensive solution.”[18]

Italy’s external facing intelligence agency, the Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza esterna (AISE) or External Intelligence and Security Agency has a similar mission set.  AISE is responsible for intelligence and counter-espionage activities carried out inside Italy, and for countering the proliferation of strategic materials.  Like the AISI, the AISE answers directly to the President of the Council of Ministers.[19]

The explicit separation of foreign and domestic intelligence is a philosophy that we share with both the UK and Italy.  In the UK, that separation is maintained by having two agencies, MI5 and MI6.  In Italy, the separation is maintained between AISI and AISE.  In the US, the separation is between FBI and CIA.  While our three countries maintain that separation in different ways, we do emphasize our philosophy of separation, and we advertise that separation to our citizens and to the world.  In contrast, Germany opts to not emphasize that separation.  The Bundesnachrichendienst explicitly “supports the Bundeswehr in missions abroad and the law enforcement authorities in fighting terrorism and other threats.”[20]

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

The UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is an intelligence agency under the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. GCHQ provides the government and military services with signals intelligence (SIGINT) based on collection requirements defined by the JIC.[21] Initially established as the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) in 1919, GCHQ is similar to our National Security Agency (NSA).  Like NSA, CGHQ grew from a collection need that emerged in the First World War and greatly expanded in the Second World War.  CGHQ and NSA have similar historical legacies, similar mission and technology sets, and a similar consumer base.  Thus, like the MI6-CIA, CGHQ and NSA have synergies that can be built upon for enhanced global partnering.

LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE

The UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was created in 1992 to collect intelligence on and disrupt national criminal organizations in the UK.  NCIS brought staff together from police organizations and multiple ministries to gather intelligence on individuals and organizations involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering and other organized criminal activities.[22]  While the US does not have a national-level intelligence organization that mirrors NCIS (our NCIS has an entirely different mission), we do have multiple agencies have created “fusion” centers at the operational level and tactical levels for law enforcement purposes.  For example, multiple federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have come together to form Field Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs) to support the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission with the U.S. Coast Guard as the lead agency.

The UK’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), also known as Scotland Yard includes a Directorate of Intelligence with multiple centers of excellence that support MPS missions. Under the Directorate of Intelligence, a Scientific Intelligence Unit conducts behavioral analysis and DNA analysis of sexual offences and murders.  The Drug Related Violence Intelligence Unit collects on individual criminals and trafficking organizations, and coordinates with law enforcement organizations throughout the British Commonwealth, in Europe and in American countries.  A Financial Disclosure Unit collects intelligence in support of Scotland Yard’s anti-money laundering mission.  The Special Branch was formed in 1883 to focus on Irish separatists.[23]  As the UK’s chief federal law enforcement agency, Scotland Yard has similarities with our FBI, and our organizations have worked well together for many years.  The two organizations both have rich historical legacies, overlapping mission sets, and similar investigative and intelligence techniques.  Thus, like MI6 and CIA, and like CGHQ and NSA, Scotland Yard and the FBI have synergies that can be built upon for more enhanced partnering across borders.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

The UK’s National Intelligence Machinery is subject to ministerial, parliamentary, and judicial oversight.  The Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for the UK Intelligence Machinery. He is advised by the Security and Intelligence Coordinator, who ensures that the activities of the agencies are effectively coordinated.  The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) oversees the activities and expenditures of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, and produce an annual report on intelligence activities. The ISC includes nine members drawn from both the House of Commons and House of Lords. The Prime Minister appoints the Committee in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.[24]  The Prime Minister also appoints two independent judicial Commissioners, who also produce an annual report.  The Commissioners “must be persons who hold or have held high judicial office,” and are appointed for a three-year period, with the possibility of re-appointment.[25]

In the UK, oversight is based on three key pieces of legislation.  The Security Service Act of 1989, amended in 1996, details the responsibilities and scope of MI5, and placed that agency under the authority of the Home Secretary.  The Intelligence Services Act of 1994 (ISA) established the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), which is described above.  The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000  (RIPA) established a Commissioner for Interception, a Commissioner for the Intelligence Services and an Investigatory Powers Tribunal to examine complaints based on the Human Rights Act 1998.  The ISA and the RIPA provide for warrants to be issued by an appropriate Secretary of State for intelligence collection, interception of communications, and covert human surveillance activities.[26]

Italy’s intelligence oversight program is similar.  The President of the Council of Ministers has “oversight and overall responsibility for security intelligence policy in the interests and defense of the Republic and its underlying democratic institutions.”[27]  A Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic includes five Deputies and five Senators who are appointed by the Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament, with equal representation of the majority and the opposition groups.  The Parliamentary Committee is tasked to “constantly and systematically verify” that activities are carried out in accordance with “the Constitution and the law.”[28] And, it is bound by law to maintain secrecy.[29]

While the US, UK and Italy certainly differ in the way we conduct intelligence oversight, it is fair to say that we are philosophically aligned, and that the components are similar.  For example, the ISA and the RIPA have many of the same ingredients as our own USA Patriot Act of 2001, and our Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  Like our President and DNI oversee our intelligence community from the executive level, the British Prime Minister and Security and Intelligence Coordinator oversee the National Intelligence Machinery from the executive level.  Like our House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and our Senate Select Committee on Intelligence provide congressional intelligence oversight, so do the UK and Italian parliaments. (Interestingly, our 9-11 Commission report recommended creating a joint congressional intelligence committee including members from both congressional houses, similar to the UK and Italian models.[30])  While we don’t have judiciary Commissioners like the UK, our judiciary branch does ultimately review and adjudicates warrants to collect intelligence on domestic targets, similar to the way it is done in the UK.  Here again, in the intelligence oversight dimension, we have synergies with these allies.

CONCLUSION

The US intelligence community is part of a hodge-podge enterprise of semi-connected national security infrastructures and agencies.  Although we are still in the early stages of integrating our own national intelligence community into a more coherent whole, we are now being asked by policy makers to significantly improve the way we integrate and interoperate with our partners around the world.  It is a very tall order.  This paper was intended to provide a quick look at the landscape where that integration will need to take place, and to examine some examples of where the synergies and non-synergies lay.

The paper shows that we do have synergies that can be used as starting points for greater integration.  Yet, there are significant dissimilarities that we will need to overcome, especially when we look beyond partners like the United Kingdom and Italy, and especially when we consider deepening our partnerships with some newly emerging powers.  Greater granularity is what we need next.  Before we can move forward to better integration, improved interoperation, and ultimately to an improved national security environment, we will need to understand the synergies and non-synergies at more granular levels.  We need to expose the gaps before we can begin to close the gaps.  Only then can we achieve the aspirations that have been articulated in our highest-level strategy documents.  The operational and tactical gaps are the easiest to close.  The philosophical gaps will present far greater challenges.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, The Stationary Office, London October 2010.

Agenzia informazioni per la sicurezza esterna home page, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_aise, last accessed February 12, 2012.

Agenzia informazioni per la sicurezza interna home page, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_aisi, last accessed February 12, 2012.

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) website, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/, last accessed February 12, 2012.

Bundesnachrichendienst home page, http://www.bnd.bund.de/cln_227/nn_1435342/EN/__Home/Startseite/startseite__node.html?__nnn=true, last accessed February 12, 2012.

Chapter 1, Section 1, Law No. 124 of 3 August 2007, “Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic and new Provisions governing Secrecy” Published in Official Journal no. 187 of 13 August 2007.

Chapter 4, Law No. 124 of “Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic and new Provisions governing Secrecy” Published in Official Journal no. 187 of 13 August 2007.

Chapter 5, Law No. 124 of “Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic and new Provisions governing Secrecy” Published in Official Journal no. 187 of 13 August 2007.

Dipartimento informazioni per la sicurezza home page, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_dis, last accessed February 14, 2012.

Federation of American Scientists website, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/gchq/index.html, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

Gary M. Shiffman and Jonathan Hoffman, “The Department of Homeland Security: Chief of Coordination” The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2011.

Government Communications Headquarters CGHQ website http://www.gchq.gov.uk/Pages/homepage.aspx, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

Jon Rosenwasser and Michael Warner, “History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States: Murphy’s Law?” in George and Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2011.

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) homepage, http://content.met.police.uk/Home, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

National Counterterrorism Center website, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington, DC, October 2010.

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Secret Intelligence Service MI6 website, https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/uk-national-security-strategy.html, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, The Stationary Office, London October 2010.

Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/how-we-operate.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/national-intelligence-machinery.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

The 9-11 Commission Report.

The National Intelligence Strategy, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC, August, 2009.

United States Pacific Command Strategy: Partnership, Readiness, Presence, US Pacific Command, Hawaii, April 2009.

Copyright 2012 by Daniel T. Murphy


[1] Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC 2011, page 334.

[2] Jon Rosenwasser and Michael Warner, “History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States: Murphy’s Law?” in George and Rishikof, page 11.

[3] George and Rishikof, pages 334-335.

[4] Gary M. Shiffman and Jonathan Hoffman, “The Department of Homeland Security: Chief of Coordination” in George and Rishikof, pages 203-220.

[5] United States Pacific Command Strategy: Partnership, Readiness, Presence, US Pacific Command, Hawaii, April 2009, page 10.

[6]National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington, DC, October 2010, page 28.

[7]The National Intelligence Strategy, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC, August, 2009, page 16.

[8] The National Intelligence Strategy, page 16.

[9] A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, The Stationary Office, London October 2010, page 9.

[10] Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, The Stationary Office, London October 2010, page 9.

[11] Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/national-intelligence-machinery.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[12] Dipartimento informazioni per la sicurezza home page, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_dis, last accessed February 14, 2012.     

[13]Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/how-we-operate.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[14] Agenzia informazioni per la sicurezza interna home page, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_aisi, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[15] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) website, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[16] Secret Intelligence Service MI6 website, https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/uk-national-security-strategy.html, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

[17] Secret Intelligence Service MI6 website, https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/uk-national-security-strategy.html, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

[18]Secret Intelligence Service MI6 website, https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/instability-and-conflict-overseas.html, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

[19] Agenzia informazioni per la sicurezza esterna home page, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_aise, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[20] Bundesnachrichendienst home page, http://www.bnd.bund.de/cln_227/nn_1435342/EN/__Home/Startseite/startseite__node.html?__nnn=true, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[21]Government Communications Headquarters CGHQ website http://www.gchq.gov.uk/Pages/homepage.aspx, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

[22]Federation of American Scientists website, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/gchq/index.html, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

[23]Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) homepage, http://content.met.police.uk/Home, last accessed on February 12, 2012.

[24] Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/oversight.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[25] Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/judicial_oversight.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[26] Security Service MI5 website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/oversight.html, last accessed February 12, 2012.

[27]Chapter 1, Section 1, Law No. 124 of 3 August 2007, “Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic and new Provisions governing Secrecy” Published in Official Journal no. 187 of 13 August 2007.

[28] Chapter 4, Law No. 124 of 3 August 2007.

[29] Chapter 5, Law No. 124 of 3 August 2007.

[30] The 9-11 Commission Report, page 420.

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